The Appellant, who had worked for the Respondent as an interpreter, issued claims in the ET of unfair dismissal, wrongful dismissal, arrears of wages, sex discrimination and detriment on the grounds of public interest disclosures ("whistleblowing"). The ET rejected all of his claims, but the Appellant appealed to the EAT in respect of the whistleblowing claim, contending that the ET's finding that the disclosures were not made in the public interest, but rather with a view to the Appellant clearing his name, "elides the two stages of the public interest test which are, first, whether the worker genuinely believed that the disclosure was in the public interest and secondly, whether that belief was reasonable". The EAT upheld the ET's finding that the Appellant did not have a subjective belief in the public interest element of his disclosure, and the Appellant appealed on the ground that it was arguable that the ET did not address satisfactorily the question whether he believed that his disclosure was in the public interest or that such belief was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal; accordingly, the preliminary hearing in the whistleblowing claim would be remitted to the same ET for further hearing on the issue of whether the Appellant had a subjective belief that the disclosures were in the public interest and, if so, whether such belief was reasonable.