1. The Claimant was employed from 2002. He was paid by a mixture of salary and bonus. Such were the employer's economic circumstances that from December 2007 there were discussions about whether bonus could continue and, if so, at what level. By September 2010 the employer had had reason to speak to the Claimant about what were described as performance issues. A week later on 24 September he began a period of sick leave from which he was never to return, but three days later issued a grievance complaining about a number of aspects of the behaviour of the Respondent toward him, which he was later to say were fundamental breaches of its obligations to him.

1. In its review of the facts it is striking that the Tribunal never criticised the employer for any of the actions it had taken toward the Claimant. On a number of occasions it specifically went out of its way to acquit the employer of any breach. There was nothing, therefore, to show that the Tribunal took the view that the employer had acted in any way unreasonably toward the employee.

1. Whilst sick, the employer sought information from the Claimant's medical practitioner, which the Tribunal found that the Claimant had agreed to provide. Though later the Claimant was to argue that it was a fundamental breach by the employer of is contract of employment for the employer to contact his general practitioner to make enquiries as to his health, on the findings of fact that was precisely what the Claimant had indicated the employer was at liberty to do. When the employer found that it could not get the information it wished as to the continuing state of ill health of the Claimant, it restricted the level of sick pay which it was paying to the Claimant. Pay was discretionary, it should be emphasised.

1. It is not difficult to understand how that passage of events, and it may well be the nature of the illness, led in due course to a meeting on 12 January 2011. The employer wished at that meeting to discuss the Claimant's state of health and the grievance letter with him, to deal with the issues which were outstanding about the Claimant's performance and the return of the company car which he had kept. The Claimant gave evidence, see paragraph 66, that he requested a compromise agreement at that meeting, that is he indicated to the employer that he wished to leave its service and wished some form of financial settlement when he did so. That, as it happens, was contrary to his ET1 in which he had suggested that the compromise agreement suggestion came from his employer.

1. It is apparent that the meeting on 12 January was not a happy one. At paragraph 67 the Tribunal recorded what the employer's manager said at that meeting:

"At the end of the meeting you stated that you considered your relationship with Jeffersons to be broken. This was not our view but I accept that you cannot be dissuaded from this and on reflection when we consider the tone and nature of your recent communications, including the tone you adopted at our meeting, we reluctantly accept that our trust and confidence in you has totally broken down."

1. The letter went on to state:

"We have always wanted you to return to work as a happy fully performing employee and have tried our best to facilitate that during your time off sick, despite the above concerns. During the meeting on 12 January you made it very clear that your return to work is not an option as you view your relationship with Jeffersons as broken. We must now concur in this view and accept that your employment relationship with Jeffersons is at an end by reason of a total breakdown in trust and confidence between the parties. Therefore in law there is no entitlement to either party to give or receive notice. I can confirm that for convenience the last day of your employment will be 31 January 2011 […]"

1. Although it was at one stage contended that there had been a mutually accepted breakdown of trust and confidence such that the contract of employment terminated for that reason and not by dismissal, that argument has not been pursued before us. It is accepted that that letter was the letter of dismissal. The reason it gave for dismissal was twofold; first that the Claimant was maintaining that he would not return to work because his trust and confidence in the employer was shattered, and secondly, that the employers trust and confidence was reciprocally broken. Accordingly the reason for the dismissal, as set out in a letter, was a bilateral loss of confidence. The employer was saying in the letter that the breakdown was irretrievable and that that had been the view expressed by the Claimant.

1. Although those extracts from the letter are set out by the Tribunal as part of the context, the other aspects of the context, as we mentioned in our opening remarks, were that the Claimant thought and still submits that the behaviour of the employer toward him in a number of distinct respects was such that he was entitled to regard his employment at an end and that he did so. No suggestion was made by the employee to the Tribunal that there had not been a breakdown of trust and confidence on his part. He did seek to put the blame for that on the employer but as to the basic fact that there had been such a breakdown there was no issue, nor was there from the Respondent. The Tribunal itself did not at any stage indicate that it took the view that there had been anything other than a mutual complete breakdown of trust and confidence, which in the concluding words of paragraph 123 it described as an irreparable breakdown. In context, we do not see that, in the light of the findings of the Tribunal, as being an overstatement.

1. Against that background the parties made their submissions. Because of the way in which the Claimant argued the case (that there was no actual dismissal but rather conduct by the employer which entitled the Claimant to treat himself as the victim of a repudiatory breach and therefore to resign) no question was put to any witness for the Respondent asking why it was that there was no further discussion after 12 January.

1. The Tribunal having set out of the law, and having noted that it had been referred to the cases of Perkins v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust [2005] IRLR 934 CA and [Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust]() [2011] IRLR 550, EAT, first accepted (see paragraphs 117 and 118) that dismissal had taken place on the grounds of some other substantial reason. That is a reference to the fuller phrase, each word of which deserves to be remembered in section 98(1)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. It is for the employer to show that the reason or be:

"That it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held."

1. Here, by use of the shorthand "some other substantial reason" the Tribunal was saying, as we understand it, that the reason was of a kind which would justify the dismissal of an employee. That left, however, the question posed by section 98(4):

"Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer) -

(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employers undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and

(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case."

1. The section focuses upon the particular circumstances of a particular case. It does not apply a "one size fits all" approach to any dismissal for any particular reason. The Tribunal dealt with section 98(4); at paragraph 122 it said:

"The Tribunal finds that this Respondent did not act reasonably in treating that [the reason identified] as a reason to dismiss the Claimant at that moment in time."

1. That was not so much amplified as restated in paragraph 123, the critical paragraph in the reasoning in which the Tribunal said this:

"Following the meeting on 12 January the Respondent wrote to the Claimant and terminated the relationship. There was no further meeting; no further discussion and that cannot be a fair dismissal. This case can be distinguished from that of Ezsias. From that case report it is clear that the Trust had commissioned an independent HR Professional's Report into the situation with the Claimant. Following the delivery of the report (of which the Claimant had a copy) there were then three meetings between the Trust and the Claimant at which he was represented. Others were threatening to resign if the Claimant came back. That is a very different situation to the case before this Tribunal. There were no further meetings with the Claimant at which he had an opportunity to put forward his position. The Tribunal also feels that Ezsias is particularly concerned with the Whitley Council terms on disciplinary procedures which again did not apply on the facts of the case before this Tribunal. The EAT also urged the Tribunals not to fall into the trap of accepting some other substantial reason as a cover for something else. Although it is accepted that the dismissal was for some other substantial reason, it is the view of this Tribunal that it would be at fault if it then found that that dismissal was by virtue of applying Ezsais a fair dismissal when there was no attempt to follow any procedure, or indeed the ACAS Code in having a further meeting to discuss the irreparable breakdown of the relationship with the Claimant."

1. Mr Neaman, appearing here for the employer, submits that those conclusions betray an error of law. The sole focus of attention should be the requirements of section 98(4). The Tribunal in assessing whether those requirements have been fulfilled should have asked whether what the employer did fell within the range of reasonable responses. The only criticism it made was the failure to hold a further meeting. That was premised on the idea that there was an obligation to follow a procedure of a particular kind when dismissing an employee. That, he submitted, was an impermissible gloss on section 98(4) where there is nothing that says that a failure to follow a specific procedure is necessarily unfair.

1. He pointed out that the Tribunal had suggested that the ACAS Code should have been followed. By the ACAS Code the Tribunal could only have meant the ACAS Code of 2009 which is headed "Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures". As the foreword makes clear, it is designed for disciplinary and grievance procedures, although, as Mr Shaw pointed out, it might be that it is capable of extending beyond strict disciplinary and grievance situations because of the wording of the first bullet point in paragraph 1:

"Disciplinary situations include misconduct and/or poor performance."

1. The word "include" might suggest that misconduct and poor performance is not a conclusive list. Be that as it may, there is nothing in our view to suggest that the Code of Practice had anything in particular to say in respect of the situation which the Tribunal identified here. That situation was one in which the employee had expressed an unshakeable determination not to return to work. He had expressed an irretrievable breakdown of the relationship with his employer. The Tribunal had concluded that the breakdown so far as the employer was concerned was irreparable.

1. Accordingly, the Code has nothing to say of relevance to the present circumstances, but if it did, it should be worth noting, in respect of the suggestion that should here have been a further meeting or meetings, that the code itself appears to envisage one meeting to discuss the problem followed by an appeal if necessary as being a sufficient procedure. The response by Mr Shaw, appearing as he did below for the Claimant, was that the arguments of the Appellant demonstrated a confusion between section 98(4) and a fair procedure. He rightly submitted that it was not sufficient to justify a dismissal that a reason for it be identified. The employer had to act reasonably in treating that as a reason which did indeed justify the dismissal which followed. That he viewed as procedure.

1. He could not, however, answer here what it was that a further meeting or further discussion would have had to offer in the particular circumstances of the case. If, indeed as the Tribunal found, the breakdown was beyond repair then it might be thought that there was nothing that a meeting could sensibly add. Nor could he assist with the rather curious interpretation in paragraph 123 of the reference to urging tribunals not to fall into a trap of accepting some other substantial reason as a cover for something else followed by the word "although" which suggests that that consideration had some impact upon the Tribunal's reasoning though precisely why it should is not made clear.

1. The first question for us is to decide what the Tribunal were saying in paragraph 123 was the reason for its conclusion that the employer had not acted reasonably. We accept that it was saying that it was unreasonable not to have a further meeting or further discussion. Mr Shaw points out that discussion falls short of meeting but does involve some constructive communication between the parties.

1. The need for a further meeting and why a further meeting should be an essential aspect of fairness in the present case is, however, not spelt out by the Tribunal. By using the words: "There was no further meeting, no further discussion and that cannot be a fair dismissal", the Tribunal appears to be stating a proposition of law. If so it was wrong to do so. The law is contained in section 98(4). Section 98(4) does in terms require a given or any procedure involving further meetings. That is not to say that in most contexts a decision would not be unfair if there were no such meetings. It is plain that what is unreasonable or reasonable may often depend upon such a meeting or meetings, but as we have already pointed out, all depends upon the particular circumstances of the case to which section 98 makes explicit reference.

1. As it was put during the argument the expression of opinion here looks rather like a knee-jerk reaction by a Tribunal. Here it was requisite that the Tribunal should have considered what purpose in fairness such a further meeting would have had. The Tribunal does not explain that. It says that there were no further meetings with the Claimant:

"At which he had an opportunity to put forward his position."

But his position had already been to state that he would not return to work and that he had totally lost confidence in the employer. The Judgment is to the effect that there had been a mutual and irreparable breakdown of confidence. To have a further meeting to restate that position, which on the findings of fact would be all it could achieve, would be to require the parties to go through a meaningless charade simply for the sake of it. It is no part of a fair procedure to be conducted for the sake of it if the procedure is truly pointless.

1. The Tribunal went on to suggest by what it said about the Ezsias case that it was taking an absolute approach to the need for a "procedure" without which there could not, as a proposition of principle, be a fair dismissal.

"Although it is accepted that the dismissal was for some other substantial reason, it is the view of this Tribunal that it would be at fault if it then found that that dismissal was by virtue of applying Ezsais a fair dismissal when there was no attempt to follow any procedure, or indeed the ACAS Code[…]"

1. The reference to procedure there is not as we see it in context a reference to the approach to the reasonableness of the decision identified for the dismissal. It is referring to something of a formal nature such as would be applied in most employments if what was in issue was a disciplinary offence or an issue of capability. Here, however, as Mr Neaman observes misconduct was not the reason for the dismissal, although disciplinary proceedings were anticipated if the Claimant should return to work. They had not even begun and therefore obviously were not concluded, and there is no suggestion that the dismissal took place because they were anticipated in the offing.

1. This was, therefore, simply a case in which there had been a recognised complete breakdown of trust and confidence between the parties. We cannot for ourselves see, and the Tribunal does not say anything to enlighten us, what the purpose of having a further meeting in these particular circumstances would be; Mr Shaw cannot help. We would simply emphasise that section 98(4) has to be applied sensibly and with regard to the substance of the case. It should never result in a Tribunal applying a standard approach to a case, certainly without considering whether that case fully and properly justifies such an approach. It invites the Tribunal to consider the circumstances of each case, which inevitably differ.

1. There is much force in Mr Neaman's approach to Ezsias which is that he submitted it was relevant before the Tribunal for one matter only, which was that a breakdown in trust and confidence was capable of being some other substantial reason justifying dismissal, but the Tribunal referred to it at paragraph 123 in order to distinguish it. Part of Mr Neaman's argument, on paper, was that the distinction ignored the main points of difference.

1. For us it seems that the logic which the Tribunal adopted was probably this. It recorded the submission made to it by the Respondent as being that Ezsias not only went to the proposition we have already drawn from it, but also that there was no requirement as such to go through a disciplinary hearing where a dismissal was for some other substantial reason which consisted of a loss of trust and confidence. As a matter of factual history, that is so in the Ezsias case: much of the debate was about whether proceedings by way of disciplinary hearings were required by the particular contractual arrangements under which Mr Ezsias worked. Since the dismissal was for some other substantial reason, and not by reason of misconduct, there was no requirement for those proceedings to be held.

1. It is a matter of fact that in the Ezsias case the Tribunal did not find the dismissal unfair because there was no such hearing, but it must be remembered that cases should be cited for the principle they contain and not merely as factual illustrations of what might be supposed to be somewhat similar circumstances. Here, as the Tribunal said, the circumstances are quite different even though there is room for disagreement as to the precise nature of those differences. However, Ezsias does reflect, at least to that extent, that there is no absolute rule that a hearing is required in each and every circumstance where a reason for dismissal is identified, and as we have indicated, the Tribunal appeared to be approaching this case as if one were without asking whether any further hearing might have added anything of value.

1. It follows that since we consider the Tribunal's approach to be in error of law in the respect we have identified, the appeal must be allowed. Mr Shaw rightly and realistically conceded that if we allowed the appeal that we should ourselves should substitute a finding that the dismissal was fair in substitution for the finding of unfairness which the Tribunal reached, and we do.

1. It may be that in the outcome it makes little difference to the parties given a heavy hint which the Tribunal made toward the conclusion of his Judgment as to the likely low level or lack of compensation when that came to be assessed. It follows, however, from our decision that compensation will not be an issue any longer in this case.

1. We express our gratitude to the parties for the focus and succinctness of their submissions and their respective sides.