1. By way of preliminary observation, the Respondent noted that, whilst the Court was required to have regard to the Convention, that gave no freestanding right. In the employment context, the Convention was given effect by the EqA, which had provided the legal basis for the Claimant's claims: section 13 (direct discrimination) and section 26 (harassment). It was important to note that the EqA also implemented the Convention by providing protection against indirect discrimination; albeit not a basis of claim now pursued on this appeal.

1. Turning to the points raised on the appeal, the Respondent contended that the Claimant was seeking to pursue what were said to be points of law when, in truth, the matters raised simply did not arise given the ET's findings of fact on the issues before it. Specifically, it was not in issue before the ET as to whether the Respondent was entitled to find the Claimant had misconducted herself; the Claimant's complaints had related to the procedural aspects of the disciplinary process. That infected the matters raised by the appeal. On the issue of sanction, that only arose given the Respondent's finding of misconduct, which was itself not challenged (save by reference to procedural matters, all of which had been rejected by the ET). As for mediation, that could not be implemented in the absence of a complainant to mediate with and EN had left the Respondent's employment by the relevant time. It was important that these points were kept in mind when addressing the individual grounds of appeal.

1. Ground A was premised on the proposition that the decision to find misconduct was itself unlawful. That, however, was not an allegation made by the Claimant below. Had she done so, she would have been faced by her admission (in the internal process) that her conduct had been "inappropriate and unhelpful". The Respondent's conclusion was that the Claimant had harassed a co-worker and, as the Claimant had recognised, an employer has a legitimate right to protect and limit harassment of co-workers. The ET - after proper scrutiny of the facts of this case - had accepted that the reason for the Claimant's treatment was because she had blurred professional boundaries and put improper pressure on a junior colleague. On that basis, on the Claimant's own case, the finding of misconduct was not contrary to Article 9.

1. As for the case as it had been put before the ET, on each of the procedural complaints the ET had found there was simply no basis on which it could conclude that the treatment in question was "because of" or "related to" the Claimant's religion or belief. Even if one considered the decision to pursue the disciplinary process, the ET had correctly considered this under domestic law and reached a permissible conclusion this was not because of, or related to, the Claimant's religion or belief. It had applied the appropriate test: if the treatment was because of something other the Claimant's protected characteristic, it would not amount to discrimination for section 13 purposes or harassment contrary to section 26. Specifically, where the disciplinary process was pursued because of the Claimant's inappropriate manifestation of religious belief, an ET was entitled to find it was because of the inappropriate behaviour and not the manifestation of the religious belief (Chondol v Liverpool City Council [2009] UKEAT/0298/08); that was a matter of assessment for the first instance Tribunal.

1. Similar points could be made in respect of ground B. Again, this attempted to question whether the ET had been entitled to find misconduct when that had not been raised as an issue below. The principles laid down in Eweida and Kokkinakis did not assist the Claimant; none of the cases suggested that where a manager acted inappropriately towards a subordinate she could not be disciplined if religion formed part of the context of the inappropriate actions (again, see Chondol; which had been followed by the EAT in Grace v Places for Children [2013] UKEAT/0217/13, a case which post-dated the judgment of the ECHR in Eweida).

1. The Claimant's Article 9 rights had been protected by sections 13 and 26 of the EqA 2010, which made unlawful less favourable treatment or harassment which was "because of" or "related to" religious belief. In a case where the ET had concluded that the treatment was not because of or related to the religious belief, however, there could be no complaint that Article 9 rights had been engaged. That, it should be noted, was different to section 19 (indirect discrimination) cases. In those cases, where disadvantage to those with a religious belief was found, it would be necessary to go on to consider whether the treatment was justified and proportionate. The observations made in this respect also went to ground D of the appeal.

1. As for ground C, the Convention did not give the Claimant a complete and unfettered right to discuss or act on her religious beliefs at work. The ET had not been required to undertake the analysis now effectively urged by the Claimant (a task required in an indirect discrimination case) of identifying the PCP applicable to the Claimant and others of a protected characteristic. The ET had carried out that task in respect of the Claimant's indirect discrimination claim, which it had rejected and against which decision there was no appeal. The factual enquiry the ET was required to make in the context of the direct discrimination claim was into the basis of the treatment of the Claimant. It had done so and had concluded that it was not because of, or related to, her religious belief.

1. Ground F was premised upon an inaccurate statement of the facts. The ET had not found the Respondent was responding to "grumblings" of a co-worker but had expressly found it had faced a serious complaint. Having considered the process followed in detail - on the basis of the issues identified by the Claimant - the ET did not find it had been oppressive and had concluded that the nature of the enquiry was appropriate. Ground G was also based on a false premise. The ET had not found religious animus; the ground assumed what the Claimant had been required (but failed) to prove.

1. By ground H, the Claimant contended the ET failed to consider the applicable policy. This point had been raised late but, in any event, the ET had reached a permissible view as to the applicable policy and had not accepted the Claimant's argument.

1. Lastly, ground I sought to challenge a permissible finding of the ET which was not properly open to challenge on appeal.

1. It is common ground that whilst the ET did not have jurisdiction (as it correctly recognised) to determine self-standing claims under it, the European Convention on Human Rights can be relevant in that the ET (and this Court) has a duty under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to interpret and give effect to domestic legislation in a way which, so far as possible, is compatible with Convention rights.

1. The domestic statutory provisions underpinning the Claimant's claims (as relevant to this appeal) were sections 13 and 26 of the Equality Act 2010, which provide as follows:

Section 13(1):

"A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others."

Section 26(1):

"A person (A) harasses another (B) if -

(a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and

(b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of -

(i) violating B's dignity, or

(ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B."

1. The Claimant further relies on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion provided by Article 9 of the Convention:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

2. The freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

1. An important aspect of the Claimant's case is that Article 9 does not merely protect the right to hold a particular belief but also to manifest it. That is obviously right: without the right to express and practise beliefs, the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 9 would be rendered hollow. Seeking to translate that principle into the language of domestic law, in Grace v Places for Children UKEAT/0217/13/GE the EAT (Mitting J presiding) observed:

"6. We agree … there is no clear dividing line between holding and manifesting a belief and … an unjustified unfavourable treatment because an employee has manifested his or her religion may amount to unlawful discrimination. …" (Original emphasis)

1. I do not read the EAT's Judgment in that case as intending to extend the statutory language by its use of "unfavourable" but it is of interest to note that it apparently considered that some ability to justify the treatment (presumably, consistent with Article 9.2) must be implied, notwithstanding it was concerned with a case involving claims of direct - rather than indirect - discrimination. Ultimately, however, the EAT in Grace upheld the ET's decision because it had found that the action taken against the Claimant had not been because of her religion "but rather because of the way in which she manifested or shared it".

1. Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, interpreting the right under Article 9, have shown that the freedom to manifest religion or belief can extend, in principle, to the right to attempt to convince others of the tenets of that religion or belief (Kokkinakis v Greece [1993] 17 EHRR 397); to bear witness in words and deeds (Eweida v UK [2013] 57 EHRR 8). That said, the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief as guaranteed by Article 9 is qualified and may be limited in accordance with Article 9.2.

1. In domestic law, the expression of right and limitation - as allowed by Article 9 of the Convention - is most easily discernible when addressing cases of indirect discrimination under section 19 EqA (which may be the more obvious route of challenge in most cases involving the manifestation of a religious belief). Whilst there is no statutory means of "justifying" direct discrimination or harassment, however, the Claimant accepts that the limitations permitted by Article 9.2 are relevant to the approach to be adopted to claims brought under sections 13 (direct discrimination) and 26 (harassment). Although the Claimant relies on the protection of the right to manifest religious belief in the workplace, as recognised by the ECHR in Eweida, she (correctly) does not seek to suggest that right cannot be subject to limitation.

1. The concession is in some senses easier to state than apply, but the task will always be made easier by having a clear understanding of the nature of the claim and how it is being put. If the case is one of direct discrimination then the focus on the reason why the less favourable treatment occurred should permit an ET to identify those cases where the treatment is not because of the manifestation of the religion or belief but because of the inappropriate manner of the manifestation (where what is "inappropriate" may be tested by reference to Article 9.2 and the case-law in that respect); see Chondol v Liverpool City Council [2009] UKEAT/0298/08 and Grace v Places for Children [2013] UKEAT/0217/13. Similarly, whilst the definition of harassment permits the looser test of "related to", a clear sense of what the conduct did in fact relate to should permit the ET to reach a conclusion as to whether it is the manifestation of religion or belief that is in issue or whether it is in fact the complainant's own inappropriate conduct (and that must be right, otherwise an employer's attempt to discipline an employee for the harassment of a co-worker related to (e.g.) the co-worker's religion or belief could itself be characterised as harassment related to that protected characteristic).

1. Against that background, I turn to the grounds of appeal. It is possible to deal with some of the points raised fairly shortly, because ultimately they do not withstand proper scrutiny (and, to be fair, were not greatly pursued by Mr Diamond in oral argument on the appeal). Thus, ground G - premised on the basis that religious animus had been established sufficient to shift the burden of proof on to the Respondent - is undermined by the fact that the ET did not find there to have been any such animus but expressly rejected the Claimant's case that there was evidence of a hostility towards Christianity in general and the CRC in particular. Similarly, where, at ground F, the Claimant complains that it cannot be legitimate for an employer to take into account the "grumblings" of co-workers to a manifestation of faith, that is answered by the ET's finding of fact that here the Respondent was faced with a serious complaint and acted on what it found to be the Claimant's blurring of professional boundaries and placing of improper pressure on a junior colleague. Her further argument under ground F - as to the oppressive nature of the disciplinary investigation - also falls away once regard is had to the ET's findings rejecting each of the procedural complaints had made.

1. Moreover, where the Claimant has pursued a perversity appeal - under ground I - her arguments have failed to engage with the ET's reasoning; significantly that the Respondent had found the gift of the DVD (consistent with the Claimant's and EN's shared interest in campaigns against human trafficking) not to have been unwanted, whereas in relation to the gift of the book (concerned with the conversion of a Muslim woman to Christianity) the evidence did not support a conclusion that this reflected a similarly shared interest; from EN's perspective, it was unwanted.

1. More generally, the Claimant's arguments as presented on the appeal have slipped between different ways of putting her claims (not always as put before the ET) and between different potential statutory bases of claim (although only the claims of direct discrimination and harassment have actually been pursued on the appeal). Mr Diamond does not see any great difficulty with this approach. He contends that once Article 9 is engaged, the obligation on the Court is to find a route for a claim to be pursued in domestic law without being overly technical as to how this is done. I have more difficulty with that. As I have sought to explain when considering the relevant legal principles, I consider that it is essential to have a clear understanding of the way in which a case is being pursued and, more specifically, I do not accept that it is open to a Claimant to move between different ways of putting her claim and then to criticise an ET for failing to specifically address a particular point when that was not part of the case before it.

1. With that in mind, I consider that the starting point for my deliberations on the central arguments raised by the appeal is to be clear as to the case that the ET had to determine (in so far as those points remain live on the appeal).

1. The Claimant had certainly complained that the sanction (the disciplinary warning) was "oppressive" - putting that matter both as a claim of direct discrimination and as an act of harassment. She had also claimed it was direct discrimination for the Respondent to have failed to implement its mediation process. Although the list of issues before the ET had not made the point particularly clear, I can allow that complaint of a failure to implement the Respondent's mediation process might be seen as another way of putting the more general complaint (made under the sub-heading "Human Rights") about the pursuit of disciplinary action (so, the decision to utilise the disciplinary policy rather than the Dignity at Work policy). And, although the specific issues identified as engaging the Claimant's Article 9 rights unhelpfully failed to indicate how the ET was to approach these complaints under domestic law, I can see how, more generally, the Claimant was saying that the pursuit of disciplinary action and the imposition of a sanction was a breach of her right to manifest her religious belief.

1. It is, however, important to note the manifestation of religious belief that the Claimant was relying on in this regard, namely the "sharing of her faith with a consenting colleague"; a way of characterising the manifestation of religious belief that also underpinned Mr Diamond's submissions, describing the Claimant's and EN's interactions as "consensual" and "voluntary".

1. That characterisation of the Claimant's case exposes, however, the real difficulty that she faces on this appeal: it assumes a factual basis that the ET's findings reject. The ET did not find that the Respondent had pursued disciplinary action against the Claimant and imposed a warning on her because of or for reasons related to her sharing of her faith with a consenting colleague. It expressly found that the Respondent took the actions it did because the colleague in question had made serious complaints about acts which blurred professional boundaries and placed improper pressure on that colleague.

1. Mr Diamond has submitted that there "was not even a balance of Convention rights to be considered" in this case: Article 9.2 simply did not arise. In support of this argument, he has contended that there was no basis for the Respondent to interfere where "EN receives a book without complaint; … EN voluntarily receives prayer (and touching) without complaint; and … EN texts messages (with encouragement) about visiting the Church of the [Claimant]".

1. Whilst no doubt representing the Claimant's case below, those contentions simply cannot stand given the ET's findings. Although the ET allowed that some of EN's responses to the Claimant's texts (inviting her to CRC events) were friendly in tone, they were also consistent with her finding excuses not to accept those invitations. EN's complaint had described how the Claimant's attention had begun to make her feel ill and had "completely ruined her first year of practice". During the disciplinary hearing, the Claimant had accepted that her conduct had been inappropriate. As the ET's findings make clear, the Respondent had been careful to distinguish between that conduct which might have been wanted (i.e. received by a "consenting colleague"; such as the DVD) and that which was unwanted (i.e. the gift of the book and the Claimant's praying over EN and laying on of hands). The evidence that the Respondent had (legitimately, on the ET's findings) accepted just did not support the characterisation of the exchanges as the sharing of faith "with a consenting colleague". The way in which the Claimant behaved engaged EN's rights and that was the issue with which the Respondent had to engage.

1. In oral argument, Mr Diamond cautioned against Courts or Tribunals seeking to form a view as to whether a person might be too vulnerable to be a proper recipient of the sharing of religious faith. That is, however, not what the ET purported to do in this case. The evidence was that EN (who, the Claimant had accepted, might properly be described as "vulnerable") had herself complained about the Claimant's conduct, characterising it as inappropriate; something the Claimant had accepted might have been so in certain respects. Keeping its focus firmly on the reasons why the Respondent had taken disciplinary action against the Claimant, the ET was clear that it did so because of, or for reasons related to, the Claimant's blurring of professional boundaries and placing of improper pressure on a junior colleague. The Claimant was not subjected to disciplinary process or sanction because she manifested her religious belief in voluntary and consensual exchanges with a colleague but because - as the ET expressly found - she subjected a subordinate to unwanted and unwelcome conduct, going substantially beyond "religious discussion", without regard to her own influential position. The treatment of which the Claimant complained was because of, and related to, those inappropriate actions; not any legitimate manifestation of her belief.

1. And that is also the answer to the claim that the sanction imposed by the Respondent was "oppressive". The Claimant does not say (and could not reasonably say) that a final written warning, reduced to a written warning on appeal, was an oppressive sanction when an employer has made a finding of serious misconduct. I have already considered the way that the Claimant sought to attack the basis for the disciplinary process; an attack premised on a finding of consent on the part of EN that the Respondent had not found. Once that fails, there is no basis for the complaint that the sanction was "oppressive"; as the ET concluded:

"122. … the sanction was not oppressive, the Claimant had been accused of serious misconduct amounting to a misuse of power. …"

1. It is also part of the answer to the other way of putting the Claimant's case on appeal: that the Respondent directly discriminated against her by pursuing the disciplinary process rather than mediation under the Dignity at Work policy.

1. EN's complaint was - as the ET accepted - serious in nature; it warranted investigation. The ET considered the content of the investigation report and was:

"76. … unsurprised that the investigators concluded that there was a disciplinary case to answer."

1. The ET also considered the mediation procedure under the Dignity at Work policy and noted that the conditions identified as making that "particularly appropriate" had not existed at the relevant time: EN left the Respondent shortly after making her complaint (so, there was no "ongoing working relationship") and she had described considerable distress and characterised the treatment as "grooming". On the evidence, the ET's conclusion was plainly permissible:

"127. … In those circumstances [i.e. as described by EN's complaint], and given the corroboration found in the Claimant's admissions … we do not find that it was unreasonable to treat this as a disciplinary issue rather than a workplace grievance to be resolved by discussion. We bear in mind that the Claimant had been counselled about what was appropriate in the workplace before. …"

1. For all those reasons, I am satisfied that the ET approached its task correctly and provided a proper and adequate explanation of its reasons. I duly dismiss this appeal.