The British Claimant of Pakistani heritage was employed from 2013 to the end of 2017 as a journalist by the Respondent broadcast media organisation domiciled in Atlanta, Georgia, under a contract of employment governed by the law of Georgia, USA. The Respondent had a subsidiary based in London, with which the Claimant had dealings. She was paid under “play or pay” arrangements and worked on assignments from 2013 to February 2017, mainly but not entirely in Asia. From March 2017 the Claimant moved from her apartment in Bangkok and returned to London, seeking to become London based and while recovering from and receiving treatment for a foot injury sustained in 2014. The Respondent declined her request to become London based and after she had worked for one day on an assignment in London in June 2017, instructed the London subsidiary not to deploy her on assignments without permission from the Atlanta headquarters. The Claimant was then dismissed with immediate effect in August 2017 at the London subsidiary’s offices; her pass was withdrawn and she was escorted from the premises. She did not work for the respondent again. However, she was paid up to 31 December 2017 under her contract terms. She then brought claims for discrimination of various kinds, victimisation, unfair dismissal, equal pay and outstanding holiday pay. The judge found that the claims were justiciable in England and Wales as they fell within the scope of the legislation conferring the statutory causes of action, but only in respect of alleged wrongs committed on or after 1 March 2017, when the Claimant returned to London. The judge also held that the tribunal had international jurisdiction to determine the claims. The Respondent appealed, contending that the judge was wrong to hold that the claims fell within the territorial scope of the legislation and that the tribunal did not have international jurisdiction to determine them.

The EAT dismissed the appeal. The judge had not erred in either respect. The conclusion that the Claimant’s employment had a sufficient connection with Great Britain from 1 March 2017 onwards was based on his evaluation of the evidence and he did not err in principle or adopt a wrong approach to the evaluative assessment of the evidence. His conclusion that from 1 March 2017, London had displaced the “territorial pull” of Bangkok, the Claimant’s base for over two years until the end of February 2017, was open to him. Nor had the judge erred in deciding that the tribunal had international jurisdiction over the claims, in so far as they were within the territorial scope of the legislation. The primary legislation conferred jurisdiction over the claims in so far as they were within the territorial scope of the domestic primary legislation enacting the causes of action and remedies in the tribunal. Rule 8 of the then Rules of Procedure provided that England and Wales, rather than Scotland, was the appropriate tribunal forum. Further, the (then applicable) Brussels Regulation (EU No. 1215 of 2012) did not assist the Respondent because it was not domiciled in the EU. The Regulation did not give a non-EU domiciled defendant the right to be sued in the courts of its non-EU domicile. Further, the judge was entitled to find that the Claimant could proceed in London because (per article 21 of the Regulation) she last habitually worked there; and because (per article 20) the dispute arose out of the operations of the London subsidiary, a branch, agency or other establishment of the Respondent. The Respondent was not entitled to avoid the international jurisdiction of the tribunal over the claims (in so far as they were within the territorial scope of the legislation) due to non-service of the claim documents on it. The claim documents were sent by the tribunal to the Respondent’s London subsidiary, which brought them to the attention of the Respondent. There were few formal rules about service in the employment tribunal. The relevant rules of procedure made provision for delivery of documents. The Respondent had received the claim documents and responded by challenging the tribunal’s jurisdiction. There was no procedural irregularity.